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The aim of this last volume of our textbook series on "complex Psychology," is to deal with the purpose and meaning of all individual psychological endeavor in the Jungian sense of the term. Jung, as is commonly known, coined the term individuation to describe the objective of this conflict between the conscious and the unconscious. The objective itself, however, will only be dealt with indirectly or in symbolic terms. What we shall do is attempt to outline the path to individuation, because the objective itself is an extrapolation which usually only becomes apparent in symbolic form, if at all. Mindful of Jung's statement that in the bewildering variety of experience with so many different kinds of people, he would be loath to dispense with the compass of typology, we shall embark on what will be the first attempt to describe this individuation path or process, using this typological schema as our guide.
This will be a theoretical representation but will be based on extensive clinical experience. We have largely dispensed with casuistic description, for it often turns out to be misleading. This can be seen in what have become classical examples of this kind, such as the two detailed case descriptions in Mythology of the Soul by H.G. Baynes (London 1940), which turned out to be inaccurate. Both patients, contrary to predictions, later developed quite normally and became successful, creative people. Until a patient has died, not even analysts are in a position to have an overview and pass judgement on his development process up to his natural end. Fortunately for the two cases concerned, medical prediction is inaccurate when it comes to the workings of destiny! What is more, there is an adequate supply of literature on the subject of casuistics, in the broadest sense of the term, although these days it is often somewhat lacking in taste.
There is another reason for our choosing the typological schema as the basis of our representation of the psychic processes: the preponderance of one attitude (introverted or extroverted) or one function (Thinking, Feeling, Sensation, Intuition) in one person, and the opposite in another person, forms the basis for much misunderstanding and intolerance, but also for love and hate, war and peace. In other words, the preponderance of attitudes is the basis for the most intimate, as well as the most collective dynamic processes of our souls, and often has disastrous consequences, which could be mitigated, if not averted, if we were more aware of the differences between people in terms of their typological condition. This perspective then leads to an attenuation of the effects, as well as to a greater tolerance of others. Unfortunately, this last attitude usually comes about only with advanced age, i.e., on a physiological level, when we have already committed our worst deeds and can only forget them thanks to charitable physiological amnesia. In contrast, Jung, with his typology, attempts on a psychological level to do justice to these interesting but often irritating differences between people. He does so while we are still involved in life, before the mellowness of old age has made opposites less of a thorn in the flesh.
Since Freud and Jung, the conflict between the conscious and the unconscious has been described in terms of dynamic psychology, and with E. Bleuler it has been referred to as depth psychology. Those who have scant respect for these theories will derive little benefit from reading this book. But those who see themselves as "being on track" may occasionally gain from applying the Jungian compass. They will see whether or not the typological theory discussed in the third volume of this textbook series can prove its worth in life. The abstraction at the basis of our attempt actually comes from observing life, and should thus take on flesh and blood in the life of every individual.
"On then with the task!"
The third volume of this textbook series (Consciousness, 1989), dealt with the phenomenology of consciousness. In doing this, we brought in C.G. Jung's psychological typology, but touched only lightly here and there on the dynamics that derive therefrom. This was most clearly apparent toward the end of the book, where we attempted to summarize in seven fundamental sentences the laws arising from this typology. The opposing positions in the psyche, which are traced back to their psychological elements, always imply tensions that can vent themselves in violent movements and can confront people with crucial problems. As promised in the Preface, this volume will demonstrate these psychological dynamics under the aspect of the different typical attitudes people have; it is hoped that the application of the typology will help us bring a certain order to these phenomena.
At this point, however, we must make a preliminary comment and state certain reservations. Whenever the subject of dynamics crops up in psychology, there usually arise automatic associations to much-used model concepts from the field of physics. Ever since Freud, there have been attempts in psychology, and especially in analytical psychology, to adopt the terminology of physics to understand the essence and functioning of the libido. Libido was defined as sexual or psychic energy, leading to lots of borrowings from the field of thermodynamics. In Volume 3 of this textbook series, we objected to such misleading forms of expression. There should be no attempt to deny phenomenological parallels, but here and now we should like to warn against understanding psychological constructs in terms of the natural sciences. In the psychic sphere, libido, content, and further compounds and derivatives, such as empathy and even entropy, can only describe the determinable valency of the aforementioned external (empathy) or internal object. One could speak of consciousness as a potential, or level. But this always involves an evaluation. In physics there is no room for values, since they are a purely psychic phenomenon, with the result that our borrowings inevitably remain a pathetic reduction and the specifically psychic aspect is examined out of existence. As early as 1935, we pointed out the convergences in terminology between physics and psychology, but the reasons for this go much deeper than the physicalistic libido theories would have us superficially believe. The deeper experimental physics goes into the inside of matter, which cannot be apprehended in sensory terms, the more clearly we see in its definitions and concepts symbolic forms of expression which, in turn, reveal an extremely curious analogy to the findings of the psychology of the unconscious. So when psychologists feel provoked and apply their déformation professionnelle to seek an understanding of this curious convergence, they are not only entitled to do so but actually find it necessary. For here we are at the very point where physics and psyche come together, and this is probably one of the greatest puzzles to confront mankind.
The valency of psychic contents or concepts is, in most cases, known to us, but their dimensions are far from being measurable in the way that physical dimensions are. We can ascertain that something strikes us as particularly interesting and provides us with strong motivation or impetus, and that we have a preference for, or inclination toward, a certain thing. We can also consciously ascertain the opposite phenomena, Such as resistance, aversion or lack of impetus. The term that most easily comes to mind for this is potential. In a manner of speaking, a specific psychic content has at its disposal a high or low potential, which is simply another term for its valency.
A purely formal approach to observing psychic contents obviously dispenses with this aspect and hence leads to little more than a sort of taxonomy or classification. This, too, can be of interest, particularly if it results in a hierarchy of the concepts, but calls for a vast amount of statistical material. On the other hand, as early as the beginning of this century, Freud discovered what happens to the contents of the psyche when, for example, a specific inclination gives way to lack of interest, i.e., using the terms of reference mentioned above, when a content has lost its potential. He was able to prove that such a drop in potential affected only the capacity of the content of consciousness. As regards the content, there was no actual loss in formal terms. The forgotten or suppressed contents could be traced back to the unconscious. In other words, all that had happened was a displacement in the consciousness/unconsciousness system.
We have given instances of such displacement in Volume 1 of this textbook series. Here, too, the question arises as to whether it is particularly meaningful to observe such a phase change from an energetic point of view. If we want a systematic representation, there is more to be gained by viewing the psyche as a "self-regulating system." This term has proved valuable in the field of biology and, with the necessary changes, should also have value in the field of psychology. At any rate, a) the correlation of consciousness with the external world can easily be viewed from this angle, in that the sensory-physiological aspect belongs totally to the biological sphere. The relation b) consciousness/body can also be seen as self-regulating, the obvious example being in the case of hunger. We are now on the very border between the environment and the inner world, and here it is not so easy to demonstrate self-regulation, despite the promising statements formulated by J. v. Uexküll back in 1921. What is even more difficult to prove is c) the self-regulating relation consciousness/unconsciousness, for the simple reason that it is not really possible to conduct further experiments here. In this respect we are almost exclusively dependent on clinical observation, for psychic disturbances can be viewed for this purpose as experiments set up by Nature. Also, from a historical point of view it was the clinic that first had grounds for understanding the nature of this relation as self-regulating. In psychic disturbances, in particular, it can be seen clearly that the normally automatically functioning regulating mechanism has failed. But even in cases of good health, the cooperation between consciousness and unconsciousness is not always successful, as we can see readily in ourselves if we think about it. We need only recall Romans 7:18-19: "for to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not. For the good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I practice."
We, too, feel the way St. Paul did, and we feel sure that Parmenides was talking about this same conflict when he described people as two-headed without regarding it as an illness. But this inadequate cooperation between consciousness and unconsciousness is felt as very unsatisfactory, obviously because it indicates a disturbance in the self-regulating system. Some people can accept this state of affairs, but others feel the need to seek help, from a psychologist, for example. The task is then to rectify the disturbance in the regulating system. Ever since Freud and Jung, the procedure for this has been to take into account the contents of the unconscious that are parallel or anti-parallel to the conscious and thus be in a position to restore the missing or inadequate cooperation between the two systems. What emerges from this is the knowledge that good health corresponds to the perfect functioning of the self-regulation. And now, using Jung's working hypothesis of typology, we shall show how this relation of consciousness/unconsciousness manifests itself in the sense of a healthy development of the personality.
In the third volume of this textbook series we described Jung's typological argument in greater detail. For that reason we shall give a brief summary of it here; it will serve as the basis of our further remarks.
Jung distinguishes four formal basic or orienting functions of consciousness. His idea is to apprehend the most elementary instruments of consciousness, which cannot be further analyzed or reduced. They are thus very easily defined in comparison to the countless other characteristics of consciousness, which are at once both more complex and more complicated. He distinguishes sensation (S), thinking (T), feeling (F), and intuition (I). These functions make possible the following statement about a content of consciousness that must be dealt with:
1st Fundamental principle
The S is that something exists, and how it is made;
The T is what it is and what it means;
The F is what its value is to me; and
The I is its possibilities, such as whence it comes and whither it goes.
2nd Fundamental principle
These four functions can be divided into two pairs, in that T and F are discriminative and rational, whereas S and I are perceiving and irrational.
3rd Fundamental principle
Within the individual pair the two functions are in opposition to each other (e.g., anyone who feels cannot simultaneously think, and vice-versa). In other words, the functions are mutually exclusive.
4th Fundamental principle
So one can say that someone is a thinker, someone else a feeling type, i.e., one orients himself preferably with the thinking function, the other preferably according to his feelings. This main function is his strong point, works reliably, and is thus referred to as the differentiated, or simply, the main function. On the basis of the principle of exclusion the other function can be assumed to function weakly in comparison, which is why we refer to it as the inferior function. The other two functions have a sort of intermediate position.
Because of the opposition or exclusion relationship, Jung felt he had proven that the inferior function is largely excluded from consciousness and thus exists in the sphere of the unconscious, where it can make its presence felt only indirectly and by means of rather peculiar effects.
The starting point for Jung's typology was the fact that people usually have a preference for one specific "intellectual talent" and exploit it to the full. The second point was the observation that the relevant function (main function) takes its place in a general reference system in different ways. There are a priori two different possibilities:
The main function is related mainly a) internally, to the ego, or mainly b) externally, to the outside world.
Depending on which way the interest of the main function flows, Jung talks of introversion in the case of a), and in the case of b) of extroversion. Whether one's attitude follows a) or b) is decided by an aprioristic value accent, which has all the qualities of the numinous. For introversion the reference system is the subject and its connection with his inner world and also with the unconscious side. For extroversion the reference system is the object and the relation of the subject with the outside world.
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